

# DIASPORA DROUGHT RESPONSE SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND



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## Acronyms

CHF – Common Humanitarian Fund

GAM – Global Acute Malnutrition

MTO – Money Transfer Organisation

OIC – Organisation for Islamic Cooperation

SAM – Severe Acute Malnutrition



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## Executive Summary

This report provides findings on the Somali diaspora response to the regional drought/crisis that affected Somaliland and Puntland in early 2016. The report includes a broad mapping exercise and discussion of responses from the European diaspora, as well as an overview and some more detailed case studies of actual responses in Somaliland and Puntland. The research was undertaken by two researchers, the team leader and author who remained in the UK, and a lead researcher who visited Somaliland and Puntland and also conducted interviews by telephone across the European diaspora.<sup>1</sup>

The assignment faced a number of significant challenges, due in part to the need to develop both a broad scope (particularly in terms of the mapping exercise), as well as detailed case studies in Somaliland and Puntland. In addition, the informal nature of the processes being studied, including an almost complete lack of documentation, as well as sensitivities in providing information further complicated the study. Finally, while this study provides a significant account of diaspora actors' responses across Europe, it cannot claim to be fully comprehensive given the large and scattered nature of the Somali community within the European diaspora, and the uncertainty of knowing if most efforts have been captured.

### Key findings include:

Seventy actors, who raised and sent money, were identified through the mapping exercise. These included actors from the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany. Significant diaspora responses were known to have come from the U.S.A., Canada and the Middle East, but details were not pursued within this study.<sup>2</sup> It is useful to note that some groups, referred to in the mapping exercise, were global in nature, with no territorial focus. The UK is widely considered the most important single diaspora country location for the Somali diaspora across Europe, and Germany is noted as a small but emerging location of importance.

The types of actors captured in the study include clan-identified groups, mosques, (non-clan specific) Somali communities, **women's groups**, **youth groups**, religious organisations, formal and informal diaspora organisations and individuals. The predominant form by which the diaspora became mobilised and organised, for the drought response in Somaliland and Puntland, was on the basis of common clan identity. This is followed by fund-raising based around mosques. This is common across all countries in Europe.

Over 50% of the resources recorded within this study, raised by the European diaspora, were sent to the Awdal Drought Committee, reflecting the epi-centre of the drought/crisis, which occurred in Awdal region. This Committee is thought to have received the majority of overall resources raised and sent by the Somalia diaspora globally (estimated at around US\$ 1million). This committee and this region are associated with the Gadabursi clan, who comprise the majority of the population in Awdal region. The majority of these resources were raised by the Gadabursi clan themselves, but significant contributions are also thought to have been received by other Somalis who were aware that the situation in Awdal region was extremely dire for many people, and worse than in any other area.

The fact that the majority of resources were raised for and sent to the Awdal Drought Committee reflects the fact that the mobilisation of the diaspora was based on the clearest and most compelling evidence of human suffering;

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report the UK is included as part of Europe and the European diaspora.

<sup>2</sup> Time and resources restricted this, and the focus of the study was on the European Somali diaspora and responses in Somaliland and Puntland.

this was captured on Somali media, including Somali satellite television. However, once the needs of the most clearly identifiable people were being addressed, the rationale for resource distribution is more difficult to ascertain and is likely to be based on a combination of clan/geographic balance and the perception of needs. However, distribution of resources can become haphazard and ad hoc, especially where relative needs are difficult to assess (as there is no formal assessment process) and where assistance is being sent by multiple actors (Islamic countries and charities, Western aid organisations and Somali actors).

The main Somaliland Drought Committee handled by far the largest amount of resources in overall terms, estimated at US\$ 8-10m (in cash and kind). This included funds raised by the Somaliland public and business community, contributed and raised by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)<sup>3</sup>, resources provided from Muslim countries and Islamic charities, as well as money sent by the Somali diaspora. Diaspora contributions received were estimated at US\$150,000 for this committee. The Somaliland Drought Committee distributed or directed resources and organisations to different regions in Somaliland, including Awdal. Relatively little money was raised in or for Puntland by the diaspora.

Diaspora actors are variously organised by locality (town/city), country (between towns and cities) or networked across towns, cities and countries (e.g. via telephone, WhatsApp), or a combination of these within one network. These forms of organisation vary according to the country of residence and the geographic dispersal of Somali diaspora populations. In the UK, for example, Somali populations are concentrated in specific towns and cities and usually within certain areas of those towns and cities. This enables proximity and locality to play a major role in fund-raising. In some countries, populations are more dispersed or relatively small in any one locality so organisation takes place between different locations. In general, there is very little sense of coordination across the Somali diaspora. At the most coordination takes place within geographic locality and/or clan-based network, or within the attendees of a mosque.

The motivations and dynamics around fund-raising are thought to vary significantly across these actors; an underlying social and religious obligation to help people in distress is important, particularly where the severity of the situation and the needs of people are clear. However, other contextual factors, such as political dynamics within an area or within a social group/clan, the strength of leadership within a social group/clan, and relations and competition between different social groups/clans, amongst other factors can all influence the relative effectiveness of fund-raising.

The vast majority of actors are informal in nature, do not keep documentation on their activities and send money through Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs) or hawala, with Dahabshil (which generally conforms to the various national financial regulatory environments in Europe) particularly prominent. In addition, most of the money raised and sent is not then followed, in terms of how it is used or accounted for. It is generally sent to trusted recipients, who are known to be working in a voluntary capacity, and social and religious norms discourage attempts to request for further information on how it is used.

The relative importance of financial contributions from the diaspora, from a sending as well as receiving perspective, is difficult to fully capture and understand. Overall diaspora contributions were significant (estimated at US\$1.15 – 1.5 million<sup>4</sup> by the authors), but appear modest compared to other sources of funding. While contributions from the diaspora appear modest in absolute terms, they may represent a significant proportion of

<sup>3</sup> This includes money from Government sources as well as the Mogadishu-based business community. It is not clear to what extent the Somali diaspora contributed to these funds but the authors found little evidence of it.

<sup>4</sup> All figures should be treated with caution and taken as indicative only.

disposable income for contributing households in the diaspora, many of whom will also be sending money on a more routine basis to family members back home. Furthermore, the direct financial contributions from the diaspora do not capture all of the effective diaspora response, as public contributions in Somaliland and Puntland may include a proportion of remittance transfers received by households and then redirected to the respective drought committees or to other recipients.

While Awdal region contained the epi-centre of the drought/crisis, the visible disaster there may well have provided the catalyst for a much wider resource mobilisation process from all actors – Somali, OIC, Western – which was arguably more than was required and was received relatively late. While Somali resources were amongst the earliest to arrive (from March) and were critical for the worst affected populations, much of the resources – from all other sources, including OIC and Western – can be considered to have arrived late (in April), once rains had arrived and eased the situation.

Religious leaders, organisations and networks were important in a number of ways to the response, particularly to increase trust and accountability in the overall process (for fund-raising and distribution of resources). Their role is most evident in the Somaliland Drought Committee and the Puntland Drought Committee, where religious figures were prominent and were in these positions to add credibility and trust; their presence alone provides some level of guarantee the funds will not be misused.

Cash resources raised and received by the various Committees and clan structures were mainly used to buy and distribute food and pay for or subsidise water-trucking. These resources paid for the goods themselves as well as their transportation. A proportion of the money was spent on paying for tractor hours for ploughing (in the far western agricultural areas) and some has been saved.

The overall effectiveness of the response by diaspora actors is extremely difficult to judge and to a large extent their role is to raise money and hand it over to actors in Somaliland or Puntland, from whom they do not demand or expect any further feedback or information. The response of the Awdal Drought Committee appears to have been most effective as it was closest to and specifically responding to the most severe signs of human suffering. In addition it is considered a well-respected Committee with previous management experience. Comments on responses by other actors were very mixed, with some respondents praising particular organisations, individuals or companies and others commenting on haphazard responses and an abundance of aid (from different sources all going to the same areas).

Some preliminary comparisons between Somali and OIC/Muslim aid organisations and Western aid organisations were made, and these include the suggestion that Somali and OIC organisation respond well to clear evidence of suffering but are not connected to other early warning information networks or processes. Some Western INGOs are reported to have responded early on the basis of early warning information. In addition, Somali and OIC aid tends to be delivered in one-off distributions to different locations, where Western agencies tend to support the same communities and households over a longer period of time. Finally Somali and OIC actors are reported to reach further into rural areas and have more flexibility in their approach (they are able to change location or beneficiaries easily) where some respondents suggest Western agencies tend to work closer to main roads and stick to fixed plans (such as supporting the same households on a beneficiary list over time).

## Recommendations

*Developing* a more in-depth understanding of the motivations, processes and dynamics around diaspora resource mobilisation in times of emergency requires *a case study approach*, using researcher/s that have or can gain access to particular clans or social groups, and who have sufficient time to undertake the work (the process may take place over several weeks). Ideally such case studies should be developed in real time (as a response process is taking place). Such case studies should include time in the diaspora location and the possibility of following the money to see exactly how it is used in-country. The main caveat with this approach is in being able to find researchers that have or can develop good access to key informants while maintaining a degree of objectiveness. Furthermore, any engagement with diaspora populations on sensitive issues should have a strong ethical underpinning, in order to avoid any potential negative repercussions to remittance sending populations.

*Matching funds* raised by the diaspora with funds provided by an organisation such as DRC, may enable greater access to information and understanding of diaspora-related humanitarian activities and potential collaborations.

Exploring in more detail the role and potential of the *Somalia media* (satellite TV and websites) in relation to humanitarian responses would be useful to develop; for example, focused research on the potential to utilise media to promote key messaging (e.g. in relation to early warning and early action or prevention activities), or to improve coordination and accountability.

*Consider convening a series of workshops* in different locations/countries, across Europe, to explore the potential for and limits to improved coordination amongst Somali diaspora groups in response to a disaster.

## Introduction

This study looks at diaspora responses to the 2016 drought in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland). The study is funded by ECHO as part of the Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination (DEMAC) project. Diaspora populations around the world have been of increasing interest to developmental and humanitarian actors for some years. This is also the case in Somalia where the diaspora comprise a particularly high proportion of the overall population and where their remittances account for an unusually high proportion of the economy (UNDP, 2001; Hammond et al., 2011). The influence of the diaspora is evident across all areas of society, economy and politics (UNDP, 2001; Bradbury, 2008; Menkhaus et al., 2010; Lindley, 2010; Hammond et al., 2011).

The aim of this study was to include both a general mapping of diaspora actors across Europe (of those that responded to the 2016 drought) as well as a more in-depth analysis of how resources from the diaspora contributed to the drought response in Somaliland and Puntland, in 2016. Understanding the response of the Somali diaspora requires an understanding of the nature of the drought and crisis itself, in terms of its physical and social geography, as well as severity, as this influences the nature of the response. Furthermore, the European Somali diaspora response needs to be seen within a wider set of responses by a range of different actors, within northern Somalia, from other diaspora locations, from the OIC member states (and other Muslim countries) as well as by the Western humanitarian community. Separating out the diaspora response and resources from this wide range of actors is not always easy or possible, as resources and activities are sometimes merged. It should also be noted that the nature of the Somali diaspora response is virtually entirely informal, with very little documentation.

The report is structured as follows. Following this introduction a description of the methodology, including some difficulties encountered, is provided. This is followed by an overview of the drought/crisis itself and the different humanitarian responses that resulted. Then follows a discussion of the mapping exercise carried out across Europe. The penultimate section presents the more detailed information and analysis of the case studies explored in Somaliland and Puntland. The final section is a discussion and conclusions section.

## Methodology

The research approach planned was based on an initial survey of diaspora actors and networks that responded to the drought of 2016. This was to be done primarily by telephone. The purpose of this exercise was to identify as many diaspora actors responding to the drought/crisis as possible while collecting a limited amount of information on them (see Annex I). This would also allow key actors, and networks to be identified for more in-depth research, in Somaliland and Puntland, in the second phase. This second phase of work was to be carried out in Somaliland and Puntland, and complemented by phone-calls as required.

This was largely the approach followed, however, the field researcher, Khalif Abdirahman, was in Hargeisa, Somaliland, following the end of a different assignment and therefore began the mapping exercise from Hargeisa. He then continued this mapping work from the UK and later from Nairobi, before and after the field visits to Somaliland and Puntland took place. This ongoing process was necessary to continue to find and map new actors and/or follow-up with already identified actors. Particular locations and periods when the mapping exercise took place were Bristol (during May), and in Nairobi (within July and, following comments on the first draft of the paper, in October). The mapping work took place over extended periods of time as it required extensive networking and repeated attempts to contact and interview people. The main field visit to Somaliland and Puntland was



conducted between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> June 2016. In Somaliland, field visits took place to Hargeisa, Boroma town and district, and Gebiley town and district, and in Puntland research took place in Bosasso town, and Badhan town and district (the latter is in the contested region of Sanaag). See Map 1 for areas visited.

This mapping exercise required networking and interviewing across a large number of individuals and clans, and was influenced by the identity as well as networking and research skills of the researcher, Khalif Abdirahman. Khalif is from a small clan known for its religious identity and knowledge. The advantage of his clan identity is that it is not directly associated with any of the major clans (or their sub-clans) – Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod, Rahanweyn - and therefore is not associated with competition or grievances between different clans/sub-clans, or political affiliations, which may influence the willingness of respondents to provide information. In other words, he has a largely neutral status in the Somali social and political imagination. Coming from a small clan has also meant that Khalif invests in relations across all clans.<sup>5</sup> **A researcher's clan identity** may have advantages for some subjects, such as very good in-depth access to some groups (i.e. their own clan) but more limited access to others (i.e. other clans). Khalif has the advantage of being able to navigate across many clan boundaries as well as attempt to pursue more in-depth information with willing informants, due to his neutral status and research skills. Clan identity alone is not the only means of gaining access to networks and information; the strength of personal relationships may also enable good information gathering. **Khalif's religious** and clan identity as well as work in establishing a mosque in the UK may also have improved his access to some religious leaders and mosque-based groups.

Khalif was based in the UK for over fifteen years, and has developed extensive networks within the Somali diaspora over this time. He has close family members in other European countries. Khalif has also conducted a significant amount of telephone-based research for other studies and is therefore familiar with conducting interviews and gathering information on the telephone. Khalif Abdirahman and Nisar Majid have made extensive use of this telephone-based research methodology previously, applying the method in a number of studies and an evaluation.<sup>6</sup>

That said, a number of challenges were encountered in relation to information gathering for the study:

- Lack of documentation and uncertainty around the accuracy of figures and information provided. This applies to information gathered from the diaspora and from Somaliland and Puntland.
- Networking and interviews by telephone are time-consuming and reliant on the goodwill of respondents. Often interviews require more than one phone call, the first to introduce the subject and interviewer, get agreement to talk further and to arrange a convenient interview time, and the second to conduct the main interview. These phone conversations can be interrupted and respondents do not always respond to the request for a main interview and/or make promises to provide further information which does not materialise.
- Requests for information on finances raised and sent can be sensitive and raise suspicions. This can be for different reasons, including concerns around the legality of some transfer methods, concerns around accountability (where some mistakes or losses have taken place), and due to religious norms of not **publicising or 'boasting' about supporting the poor or needy.**<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This is an observation of the team leader, gained from working with Khalif over several years.

<sup>6</sup> For example, see Hedlund et al. 2013; Maxwell and Majid, 2016.

<sup>7</sup> It is considered morally inappropriate to boast about helping the poor where this is done as a religiously inscribed practice.

- Incomplete information gathering for the mapping exercise (respondents were not always able or willing to provide all details requested).


Finally, there was a bias towards Bristol and the UK from the diaspora mapping exercise. In part this reflects the UK/Bristol base of the senior field researcher, but also the fact that the UK has the largest single Somali population in Europe. In addition, Bristol has a significant population from western Somaliland (where the epi-centre of the drought/crisis was located), and therefore it made sense to pursue information gathering from Bristol.

## Overview of the drought and the response

### The problem – a regional drought and in-migration from Ethiopia

The catalyst for the wider 2016 crisis in northern Somalia was an ‘El Nino’ event that influenced the rains in large parts of northern Somalia as well as neighbouring areas of Ethiopia (see FSNAU reports). However, according to reports by the FSNAU many areas of northern Somalia had already received poor rains for several seasons. The regional dimensions of the drought and crisis are a critical part of the story.

Map 1. Drought affected areas and areas visited (source: OCHA 2016)



While parts of northern Somalia were experiencing a harsh dry season – the *jilaa* – in early 2016<sup>8</sup> it was the in-migration, from Ethiopia, of many pastoralists with large numbers of animals that ultimately triggered media and international attention, resulting in the mobilisation of resources. This in-migration was generated by the early *hais* rains which mainly occur in a very localised coastal area of western Somaliland (within Awdal region). These rains came in March, approximately one month prior to the arrival of the main *gu* rains that typically begin in early April across much of the Somali populated Horn of Africa. These *hais* rains led to an inflow of people and animals that were already struggling with the poor *jilaa* conditions in neighbouring, Somali populated areas of Ethiopia. This influx quickly depleted water and pasture brought by these rains. Respondents interviewed for the study commented on their surprise at the large herd sizes and numbers of animals that had arrived. Nutrition figures produced around this time clearly show Awdal region as having the worst data, with 18% SAM (Severe Acute Malnutrition) and 3.8% GAM (Global Acute Malnutrition) in January 2016, considerably worse than in September/October 2015, and considerably worse than in other regions at the same period (see HCT, March 2016). This March bulletin did not distinguish between incoming and resident populations although the FSNAU in its coverage did highlight in-migration as a significant factor in the developing situation.

The plight of these in-comers, who were largely from the Isse clan (as well as other allied clans of the Isse) was seen by the resident population of Awdal region and Boroma town, who are predominantly Gadabursi. Both Gadabursi and Isse are part of the Dir clan family. In March, Somali populations from these areas and the local media started to capture the great difficulties that the already weakened in-coming population had found themselves in, and thus began to mobilise a response.<sup>9</sup>

Reports of some deaths amongst this population were also made at this time and respondents to this study suggested that deaths would have increased without a response. Other international humanitarian actors were also now starting to raise a more significant alarm and linking the potential of a late response that led to the famine of 2011.

In March 2016, the CHF (Common Humanitarian Fund) issued US\$6m and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund issued US\$11m to respond to the drought in Somaliland and Puntland (see HCT, March 2016).

However, according to respondents, and not captured elsewhere, it was primarily the Ethiopian in-migration and desperate plight of those in-comers that was at the epi-centre of the crisis. While other parts of Somaliland and Puntland were facing a harsh dry season, the severity of the situation for the resident population, even in the most affected areas, does not appear to have been comparable to that faced by the pastoral in-migrants. There were however wider concerns within the humanitarian sector of the impact of the El Nino phenomenon, which was badly affecting areas of Ethiopia. The El Nino phenomenon and its potential impact was predicted in long-range climate forecasts, and contingency plans were in place in the humanitarian sector (see HCT, March 2016). If the *gu* rains had failed, the situation would have dramatically deteriorated (as happened in 2011, with the famine in southern Somalia).

<sup>8</sup> The main dry season in Somalia is known as the *jilaa*, and occurs from January to March. It is known as the hardest time for rural populations, particularly those with livestock.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example: <https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/failed-rains-prolong-drought-pushes-somali-communities-to-the-brink/>

## Overview of the Emergency Responses

Prior to a discussion of the diaspora mapping and diaspora-funded response in Somaliland and Puntland (sections 4 and 5), this section provides a brief overview of the different emergency responses that took place to the drought/crisis of 2016, as the diaspora response is situated within the overall response and some aspects of the diaspora response are not easy to distinguish or separate from non-diaspora responses.

### The Somali response

There was a significant Somali response to the drought/crisis of early 2016. This included financial contributions from the general public (in Somaliland and Puntland), through mosques and religious leaders in Somaliland and Puntland, the Somaliland and Puntland business communities, the Somaliland Government, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with the Mogadishu business community, and the Somali diaspora. In other words, the Somali diaspora were only one of many Somali actors who contributed to the drought/crisis response. The resources raised and responses undertaken, by Somalis themselves, were channelled through a number of different actors and mechanisms: the Somaliland Drought committee, the Awdal Drought Committee, various clan-based networks, Somali NGOs, private companies and religious organisations. Some of these different actors and mechanisms were linked and/or coordinated with each other, through the various drought committees, while others acted entirely independently (see section 5). This variety of Somali responses is consistent with those identified during the famine of 2011, in southern Somalia (see: Maxwell and Majid, 2016).

In the case of the Somaliland Drought Committee, it received resources from the general public, the business community in Somaliland, the FGS and the diaspora. This Committee was also the information and coordination hub for the OIC/Islamic charity response (see section 5). This Committee was not able to distinguish between the use of resources provided by the diaspora and from other sources.

### The OIC and Islamic Charity Response

There was a significant humanitarian response by a number of countries and charities from the Middle East (and other Muslim countries). These were mainly in the form of food aid, brought in to Somaliland in particular. These actors generally coordinated with the Somaliland Drought Committee, who directed these actors and resources on to other Committees and organisations closer to the areas of need. This response was not the focus of this study.

### The Western agency response

Western donors and agencies also responded to the drought/crisis in Somaliland and Puntland. This response was generally coordinated by OCHA, with some degree of coordination with the Somaliland Drought Committee. This response was not the focus of this study.

# Mapping the Diaspora Response

## Types of Actors and Networks

Annex I provides a list, with some basic characteristics, of approximately seventy actors and networks that were identified during the research. These predominantly come from the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. Germany also appears as a new source of Somali diaspora remittances (consistent with other recent research – see Ali, 2016). The largest category of actors captured is based on a common clan identity and are therefore not formally registered or named organisations. Approximately thirty-five of the actors listed in Annex I fall into this category. See Table 1 for a summary of these actors.

**Table 1: Summary list of diaspora actors**

Index	Numbers/types of actors	Number of actors	How transferred	How money used
1	Clan-based	35	Mainly through Dahabshil	Mainly food & water
2	Mosque	14		
3	Somali community	6		
4	Religious organisation	2		
5	Named organisation	7		
6	Individual	2		
7	Youth group	1		
8	Television-based	1		

The second largest single category of actor identified within the diaspora was mosques, with fourteen identified in different towns and cities in the UK and Europe, that had in some ways been involved in fund-raising for the 2016 drought/disaster. Mosques are generally officially registered entities in the countries they are located (unlike family or clan-based groups). Mosques are generally associated with fund-raising activities during times of disaster<sup>10</sup>, as well as during religiously important periods such as Ramadan and Eid. Mosques may or may not be associated with a particular clan identity. This depends on the identity of the Somali population who live in the vicinity of and use the mosque. Some mosques in the UK for example are associated with specific clans and therefore funds raised under the umbrella of the mosque may be directed towards a particular area and clan. However, many other mosques will represent a broader cross-section of Somali society and identity, and therefore fund-raising for a cause such as in 2016 has a cross or multi-clan composition.

The remaining categories of actors, with few identified in any particular category, included formally registered **organisations, youth groups, women's groups, general 'Somali community' groups** and individuals. Some of these categories raised money on a cross-clan basis, such as the Somali community groups, whereas others were identified with particular clans. The category of Somali community, listed in Annex I for example, refers to a cross-

<sup>10</sup> See Maxwell and Majid (2016) for examples of the role played by mosques during the famine in southern Somalia in 2011.

clan category of actors, and mobilises money on the basis of common residence, neighbourliness and a common Somali identity.

Some named organisations were identified, such as Hoodale, which is **identified with the Sa'ad Muse** sub-clan (of the Isaaq), and appears to be well known in both Somaliland and the UK, particularly within the Isaaq population. It is associated with the East African Development Organisation, a registered organisation in the UK. **A women's** group, who were acting under the name of Hoodale raised money in the UK and sent it to a prominent Sheikh (religious leader), based in Hargeysa, who is also from the same sub-clan. Another registered organisation identified was DASMO (Danish Somali Makhir Organisation), registered in Denmark. This organisation is specifically a Warsangeli clan-identified organisation.<sup>11</sup> The fact that many organisations or charities are clan-based should perhaps be no surprise as the majority of Somali NGOs working in Somalia are also identified with a particular clan.

### Fund-raising processes and dynamics

A number of fund-raising processes and different sources of funds raised were identified. Fund-raising on the basis of clan identity and solidarity usually falls under the notion of '*qaraan*', a Somali term for collection or fund-raising which can be invoked for different purposes. The majority of fund-raising occurs in this way. Clan *qaraan* may work on a largely local basis, or a multi-local and networked basis, depending on the composition of clans in the local (diaspora) area. For example, where there are significant numbers of the same clan in the same city, fund-raising may be focused on raising money from members locally. However, in some countries, Somalis are dispersed or there are not many members of the same clan in the same city. In this case little local fund-raising takes place and individuals may send money to another location or send money directly to a nominated person in Somaliland/Puntland. Clan *qaraan* does not exclude the possibility that some fund-raising also takes place outside of the narrow clan-based groups.

Fund-raising is also directed at the Somali business community and friends and neighbours (rather than on the basis of clan only). In the UK, some of the fund-raising for the Awdal Drought Committee was done amongst the wider Somali population in the area as well as the local business community. This involves personal networking and door-to-door (and shop-to-shop) approaches.

Money raised under the umbrella of a mosque typically takes place through contributions made and given to a nominated person connected to the mosque.

Some specific fund-raising events may have taken place but these were not prominent. Two examples of Somali TV being used to raise money were identified. Using the television has been noted on previous occasions.

The motivations and processes of fund-raising also vary by location in the diaspora. In some towns and cities, the Somali population may be fairly coherent and a Somali solidarity expressed through fund-raising. This is thought to be the case in Finland, where two mosques provided the focal point for fund-raising and contributions came from the wider Somali community. The Finnish Somali community is considered relatively united.

In other cities, tensions and competition between different clan-based populations are evident. In such circumstances, fund-raising may remain within clan-based groups, and competition between groups may take place. For example, where a problem is associated with one clan, another clan group may decide to fund-raise in

<sup>11</sup> Makhir is the name given by some Warsangeli to an independent polity they would like to see formed in Sanaag region.

order to justify not contributing to another group. This may be based on an assessment that they should focus on their own people (who may also be facing a difficult time, for a similar or different reason) but also because relations are strained between the clans in question.

An example of a problematic mobilisation and response process occurred within the Isse community. The Isse are located in neighbouring areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somaliland. Their geographic areas were severely affected by the regional drought with Isse pastoralists from Ethiopia moving in to Awdal region particularly badly affected. The Isse diaspora and local response was reported to have been negatively affected by the Djibouti Presidential elections that were causing tensions within the Isse at the time.

### Trust and money transfers

Across these groups the collection and movement of money is virtually entirely based on the collection of cash and transfer of money using money transfer organisations (MTOs). The largest Somalia MTO, Dahabshil, was by far the most common means by which money raised was sent to Somaliland and Puntland. Typically, money will be collected in each locality in the form of cash, and sent to nominated people. Money is sent to named and trusted people in northern Somalia, which may be to an individual account or a Committee account. A treasurer may be nominated within a Committee structure, or an individual may receive and manage the money. There is little or no form of documentation for how the money is used beyond the identification of the individuals or organisations selected to receive the money.

Religious leaders, mosques and religious networks are extremely important within Somaliland and Puntland. They **give credibility to Committees that are created to collect money. The two major 'national' bodies in Somaliland and Puntland** both had significant religious representation. Organisations that become involved in the response may also be Islamic organisations. In Boroma and Sanaag region, two Islamic educational organisations, part of the same network were provided with funds from the Somaliland Drought Committee to assist people. Other Islamic educational organisations were also involved in the response. This is not the usual work of these organisations but they are encouraged or motivated to become involved in order to help people in difficult times.

Some examples of videoing the process of handing out assistance was undertaken by some groups. One mosque-based group in Finland requested this, and it was also done by others. The value of this form of documentation was not considered useful to some respondents, who suggested that too much time was spent on making videos and not enough on ensuring the right people got the assistance.

Identification of trusted people to send money to appears to be far more important than any demand for reporting, feedback or accountability after resources have been sent. The prominence of religious leaders in the various Committees and organisations that received money and implemented responses indicates the importance of trust for individual donors.

Trust and transparency is however not uniform within these processes. A number of respondents commented that resources would not be raised or sent to certain groups or people if they were **not trusted**. **One women's group** reported that they would not send their funds to elders in a certain area as they thought that the money may be used for other – political – purposes. Another group commented that they wished that they had sent their money to a different person/organisation than they did as they heard good things about that response (see section 5 below).

## Uses of the money

The majority of diaspora money sent was used for food and/or water-based responses. This included buying food from local or central markets and traders. Cash was also used to pay for the transportation of food stuffs. Food packages have a fairly standard make-up: rice, wheat flour, sugar, cooking oil being the most common items, but food packages did vary in composition. Funds used for water either paid for water-trucking or subsidised the cost of water-trucking. Remittances are received as cash but very rarely distributed as cash.

Significant sums of money were used to pay for tractor-ploughing hours, particularly in western areas of Somaliland where there is some agriculture. Money for this purpose came from the Somaliland Drought Committee in particular, and was justified on the basis of the arrival of rains and in light of the widespread availability of in-kind food assistance that had already reached the area from different sources.

Significant donations of in-kind food were made by Muslim countries and charities. These were delivered to Hargeisa and the Somaliland Drought Committee, and some of the cash available to the Committee was used to pay for its transportation to final recipients.

## Motivations and Recipients of the Money

According to this study, by far the largest amount of money raised within the European diaspora was raised in the name of the Awdal Drought Committee and therefore in relation to the epi-centre of the drought/crisis across Somaliland and Puntland. The Awdal Drought Committee, in Boroma, Somaliland, reported that they received nearly US \$1million from all sources, the vast majority from the diaspora (in Europe and North America). This is considerably higher than all other diaspora funds identified by this study. Table 2, below, illustrates that nearly 60% of all of the money identified within the scope of this study was sent to the Awdal Drought Committee. The majority of this money is identified with the Gadabursi/Samaroon clan, however, as well as raising money from within their clan networks, they were also able to raise money from the wider Somali business community and other (non-Gadabursi) Somalis.

The fact that the Awdal Drought Committee accounts for the largest share of diaspora money reflects the fact that the situation was severe in these areas and the needs were self-evident, particularly as they were reported in Somali media, including satellite television. In addition, the Awdal Drought Committee has previously been active and has a positive reputation and credibility.

Other recipients of money raised within the diaspora were the main Somaliland Drought Committee, in Hargeisa, as well as specific organisations and clan-based groups.



*Table 2: Funds raised by country<sup>12</sup>*

Country	Amount Raised (US \$)	Amount for Awdal Drought Committee (US \$)
UK	567,000	361,700
Sweden	118,992	95,000
Denmark	100,985	42,000
Norway	54,000	54,000
Finland	24,850	16,000
Other	119,000	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>985,466</b>	<b>568,700</b>

Some individuals acted in their own right and individual capacity, rather than as part of a larger group, to raise money and organise a response. One such individual in the UK raised money from the local business community. One youth group was also identified but there are likely to have been others although the amounts such groups raised on their own were small.

At least one WhatsApp-based group was formed.<sup>13</sup> This was used by the Arab sub-clan (of the Isaaq) and provided an information sharing platform. Money was raised by clan members in different locations around the world, with WhatsApp enabling people to update each other on fund-raising processes, including amounts of money raised.

<sup>12</sup> These figures were all generated from interviewees in the diaspora. They do not cover all possible contributions but ones identified. As mentioned previously, all figures have to be treated with caution as they are based on verbal feedback rather than documentation. Where possible they have been triangulated.

<sup>13</sup> The author is aware of at least one other WhatsApp-based group created to help organise a response to a difficult situation.

## The Case Studies (in Somaliland and Puntland)

Time and resource constraints meant that specific case studies had to be identified and developed in the main field visit. From the mapping exercise, the two major areas that were affected by the drought were western areas of Somaliland and the contested region of Sanaag. Puntland did not come up prominently as an area for which there was significant attention within the wider diaspora.

Following the mapping exercise, the plan developed prior to the field visit was to develop more detailed case studies on the Somaliland Drought Committee (as the major actor in the response, who received some but limited amounts of direct diaspora support) as well as a clan, a mosque/religious actor and an NGO/charity, in each of the two most affected areas (Borama/Gebiley in western Somaliland) and Sanaag region (a contested region in the far east of Somaliland and west of Puntland).

In practice, within such an informal context the research process has to be flexible and led in part by opportunities to access willing and knowledgeable key informants. In other words, planned actors to develop case studies on may turn out to be difficult to access when in-country, and other groups may emerge who may turn out to be more useful and/or more accessible, in terms of importance and/or information gathering. As a result the following case studies were identified and are developed further below:

- Somaliland
  - The Somaliland Drought Committee (the largest single actor)
  - The Awdal Drought Committee (responding to the worst affected area and accounting for the largest diaspora response)
  - The **Sa'ad Muse** (Hargeisa and Gebiley)
    - East African Development organisation/Hoodale
    - Gebiley Drought Committee
    - **'Arab' sub-clan of the Sa'ad Muse**
    - Sheikh Adam Siiro
    - Omar company
- Sanaag region (Somaliland/Puntland contested area)
  - Focus on Badhan town/district and the Warsangeli clan (eastern Sanaag)
  - Manhaj (Religious organisation / Somaliland Drought Committee resources)
  - Salaam (Religious, educational organisation / handled largest single amount of Warsangeli clan resources)
- Puntland Sheikhs Committee (only covered briefly)
  - Major response body in Puntland

### The West

The epi-centre of the drought crisis was in Western Somaliland and concerned in-coming Isse pastoralists moving across the border to access early coastal *hais* rains in March, in Awdal region.

### The Somaliland Drought Committee

The Somaliland Drought Committee was formed by Presidential decree, in Hargeisa, in March 2016. The Committee was made up of approximately five members of the Government, five members of the business

community and five religious leaders. It was chaired by the Vice-President. The Committee estimated that it handled or coordinated approximately US\$8m, with another US\$2m having preceded its formation. The US\$8m figure includes donations of food in-kind, especially by other Muslim countries, as well as cash received by the Somaliland population, the diaspora and the business community. Of this amount, US\$1m was donated by the FGS in Mogadishu, who raised money from Government employees (especially Members of Parliament) as well as the Mogadishu business community. An estimated \$150,000 came from the Somali diaspora. Money and resources to and through this Committee and in general started to come in in March and continued into April.

The money from this Committee was used in different ways. Proportions were given to different regions. The Awdal Drought Committee is reported to have received US\$150,000 (although this is contested), the Gebiley Committee US\$100,000 (mostly used for ploughing), the Badhan response (through Manhaj) received US\$200-300,000. A significant amount was also sent to the Erigavo area in Sanaag region.

Members of the Somaliland Drought Committee carried out assessment visits to certain regions, mainly to identify implementing partners, and remained to play a supervisory role (see Manhaj response below, for example). In other cases, the Committee handed over cash resources and remained at a distance from the local body (Awdal Committee below, for example). Once a local partner had been found, decisions on who to send resources to were left to the local partners who were considered to know the local areas (and were chosen for that knowledge and presence). Once the Somaliland Drought Committee was established they appear to have worked quickly, distributing the resources that they had available and directing other actors to appropriate local groups.

The Somaliland Drought Committee helped to coordinate a large part of the response of Muslim states and Islamic Charities. This was largely done by directing them to the appropriate local bodies to work with.

### Issues arising

While the SDC did play an important overall coordinating role, which appears to have been generally successful, examples of tensions and lack of coordination did take place. Some local Committees suggested that the SDC sent some actors to specific villages without consulting with them (e.g. in Gebiley). Some actors worked entirely independently. For example, Omar is a private company dealing in food imports and it sent food packages to different areas entirely independently of any other body. Some local Committees did not appear to acknowledge or know that Islamic charities were being sent to them by the SDC (e.g. Boroma Committee).

### The Awdal Drought Committee

The epi-centre of the drought was within Awdal region, with many of the most affected communities being in-comers from Ethiopia. This committee was formed of academics, business people and elders. The Boroma Committee was considered an independent (of Government) actor, which had worked together previously. It was allowed to work as it chose with minimal or no interference by the Somaliland Drought Committee.

This committee received US\$150,000 from the main Somaliland Drought Committee, but the majority of the money, close to one million dollars, came from contributions from the Gadabursi diaspora as well as other (non-Gadabursi) Somalis who were made aware of the gravity of the situation in Awdal. This appears to account for by far the single largest diaspora source of funds (see Tables 1 and 2 above). The largest source of diaspora funds was from the UK. One individual Somali person, resident in the USA, is reported to have given US\$117,000 alone. For this study, sixteen actors (or senders) from the diaspora were contacted (out of many more that sent money). This included seven different groups in Sweden, three from the UK, one from Denmark, one from Finland, two from

Norway, one general group and one group from the Middle East (see Annex I). These groups collectively accounted for over US\$500,000. They were primarily composed of the Gadabursi but also included the wider Somali business community and other Somali contributors. The Committee had a central account with Dahabshil to which money could be deposited.

Amongst the groups that contributed to this response were the Helsinki Islamic Centre and a network of mosques in London and Birmingham, in the UK. The latter network raised approximately US\$6,800 and this was given to the Al Irshad organisation in the UK, who then transferred it to Somaliland. There was also a significant fund-raising effort within Sweden.

Some respondents suggest that, as a relatively small and politically neutral clan (in terms of wider Somali politics), they may have received significant sympathy and donations from other Somalis, where other bigger, wealthier and more politically important clans may not have.

### Targeting the in-comers

One of the priorities for the Awdal Drought Committee was to support the Isse and other Isse allies who had come in from Ethiopia, following the failure of the rains there and the *hais* rains that fell in western Somaliland. These pastoralists came with big herds and were in the worst condition. There were reports of deaths. The areas they were in were remote with poor or no roads. The Committee set up stations every 5kms, where food, water and shelter were provided.

People had also gathered in a camp, where they were assisted with funds from the Awdal committee. At the time of the field visit, to this location, there was only one family remaining in the camp (in August). Most people returned to Ethiopia as quickly as they could. They were also given rations to enable them to get home.

### Targeting the Residents

A respondent from an Islamic charity reported that he went to the Awdal Drought Committee with his resources, to consult them on what he should do. **He was directed to Ba'ado village. The rationale for choosing Ba'ado** appears to be that elders from this village had very recently visited the Committee and reported that they had not received any food so far. This process of allocating resources at the village level may describe some of the response across Somaliland, suggesting there is a certain ad hoc or haphazard nature to the response (See also the Arab sub-clan response below). In general, in terms of the distribution of resources, both clan balance as well as 'needs' are considerations according to local perceptions of fairness.

### Issues arising

Respondents for this study generally suggest that the Awdal Committee did a good job, and enabled a relatively good degree of coordination. They received significant resources, directly and indirectly, and have tried to reach the neediest people as well as spread resources around. Many parts of this region are remote and inaccessible. Reaching some of these areas, where roads are poor or non-existent, was both difficult and very expensive. However, aid from other sources also reached these areas.

Accusations of 'looting' were made by different respondents, referring to people from other areas coming in and taking food assistance. This was not raised as a major issue and was partially explained by the fact that large amounts of aid were coming in to the area at certain times and that there was a degree of duplication and some

villages and areas felt left out, suggesting that there were problems with coordination and management (within and between all sets of actors – Western, OIC-connected and Somali).

### Sa’ad Muse response (Gebiley)

The Sa’ad Muse are a large and prominent Isaaq clan (of the Habar Awal/Isaaq clan family) mainly found in Hargeisa and Gebiley region. Gebiley region neighbours Awdal region, and some areas were seriously affected by the drought conditions.

There were several types of responses concerned with the Sa’ad Muse and Gebiley region. These included the Gebiley Drought Committee, Sheikh Adan Siro (a prominent religious leader, based in Hargeisa), the East African Development organisation (with Hoodale organisation), the ‘Arab’ sub-clan response, as well as other Sa’ad Muse sub-clan responses.

The Gebiley Drought Committee was an independent, local actor but worked closely with the Somaliland Drought Committee (where the Boroma Committee was considered more distant or separate) with the Mayor of Gebiley playing an important and credited role. This Committee received resources from different sources, including different diaspora groups from across Europe as well as the Somaliland Drought Committee, who provided US\$200,000. This Committee reportedly spent US\$150,000 of the US\$200,000 they received from the SDC on tractor hours (suggesting food/relief needs were being met, or were not needed, and enabling a huge investment in activities).

### Hoodale and East African Development

The East African Development organisation (EAD) is UK-based and they work closely with Hoodale.<sup>14</sup> Hoodale is primarily active in Somaliland although it is known in the UK. According to their website EAD was started in 2013. Their website includes the flag of many different countries and is largely in Somali, suggesting that they are appealing to the Sa’ad Muse diaspora, who are located in multiple locations. They claim to have implemented different projects, including road construction and schools. They still have a specific reference to the drought of 2016 on their website.<sup>15</sup>

However, while this group was identified through the mapping exercise in the UK, there was very little mention or sign of it, during the field research. It appears that their work in relation to the drought response was small and somewhat overshadowed by the range of other actors and resources mobilised and active.

### Gurmad Relief / Arab sub-clan

The Arab are a sub-clan of the Sa’ad Muse. They are a relatively small clan within the Sa’ad Muse. Interviewees from this group suggested that they ‘were forgotten’ and did not receive much support from the main Somaliland Drought Committee, in spite of their business community reportedly contributing funds to the main Committee. They therefore raised money through their own diaspora. The Arab sub-clan worked in part through a registered NGO (in Somaliland) called Gurmad Relief.

<sup>14</sup> See the EAD website: <http://www.eastafricadevelopment.org/>

<sup>15</sup> See the EAD drought appeal: <http://www.eastafricadevelopment.org/index.php/news/107-somaliland-drought-appeal-2016>

One of the areas most affected within the Arab sub-clan's territory was **Balibugadle** village/area, on the border with Ethiopia. There was a large plain near this village where a lot of people from Ethiopia were camped. The Arab are located on both sides of the Ethiopia/Somaliland border.

A field visit took place the Balibugadle area and respondents reported that they ultimately had a good *jilaa*, as they did eventually receive significant amounts of assistance, with a local respondent claiming that people in the area did not need to sell animals to get food, as they normally would have done, and that a lot of water trucking also took place.

### Sheikh Adam Siiro

Sheikh Adam Siiro is a prominent sheikh based in Somaliland and strongly identified with the Sa'ad Muse. He worked independently, from Hargeisa, raising funds and sending them. He reportedly funded a lot of water-trucking. He received funds from the **Sa'ad Muse in the diaspora and in Hargeisa/Somaliland**. A women's group in the diaspora, who raised US\$10,000, preferred not to send their funds to Hoodale, as they felt the elders who controlled this organisation might use their funds for other activities, and they sent their money to the Sheikh instead.

### Other responses

The Omar Company was also reported to be a significant actor in the drought response. They are a large food importer and wholesaler. They distributed food to several hundred families across a wide area. They worked entirely independently of any other Committee.

## The East

The majority of the Sanaag population are Warsangeli. The region of Sanaag was considered among the worst affected regions, according to both local respondents to this study and the FSNAU. Sanaag is a contested region between Somaliland and Puntland. Within Sanaag region, Erigavo and Badhan are the two major towns. Erigavo is more closely connected to Somaliland and has a mixed population of Isaaq, Warsangeli and other clans. The study team visited Badhan town and district only, within the region, in order to develop the Warsangeli/Sanaag case studies. A significant amount of funds also went to Erigavo but this was not covered in this study due to time constraints.

In Badhan, two major responses were noted as well as a number of minor responses:

### Somaliland Drought Committee (through Manhaj)

The main Somaliland Drought Committee provided an estimated US\$200-300,000 for the response in Badhan town and surrounding areas. Two members of the committee travelled to Badhan to identify a local partner/partners to work with. Manhaj was the organisation chosen to receive funds. Manhaj is a religiously identified organisation. Its sister organisation, based in Somaliland, is Al Karam. This network therefore covers both Somaliland and Puntland and the choice of selecting this organisation by the Somaliland Drought Committee indicates the presence of religious leaders attached to the network on the Somaliland Drought Committee and their acceptance by Somaliland.

As well as receiving money from the Somaliland Drought Committee, Manhaj would have received money through the wider religious network that it is part of, though not particularly the Warsangeli diaspora.

Manhaj is a well-respected local institution and distributed food and paid for or subsidised water trucking, to different areas within the district. Pre-existing committees and local elders were used to organise relief distribution. For example, Badhan town has a number of neighbourhood committees, which represent areas of the town and who supported the distribution of aid. These committees help to ensure fair distribution of resources.

## Salaam

The other significant source of funds and response to the drought was through an organisation called Salaam. This organisation is thought to account for the majority of Warsangeli diaspora funds, although the amount involved is estimated at only US\$16,000. **Salaam's main work is** in the provision of education and is considered to be the biggest provider of education in the area.

This response to the drought was reported to be the first time that Salaam has carried out such an activity, where their normal work is education. The fact that this organisation was encouraged and supported by the diaspora reflects the trust that the diaspora have in it. Other respondents in the diaspora reported that they would have preferred to have sent money through Salaam as they had heard good things about how it worked.

## Other Warsangeli responses

A number of other Warsangeli responses were also noted. Members of the diaspora reportedly sent money to a number of different Warsangeli individuals that are known to and trusted by them. One such example is Fatima Jibrell, who is a prominent member of the Warsangeli and founder of the NGO, Adeso (previously known as Horn Relief). Adeso is one of the largest Somali owned NGOs working in Somalia, which now also works in Kenya and South Sudan. Fatima received a relatively small amount of money, thought to be less than US\$2000. She distributed money and/or food to poor people in Badhan.

## Puntland Sheikhs.

In Puntland, the Puntland administration encouraged the Bosasso based Sheikhs to take the lead on the drought response. The official Puntland Drought Committee that was initially created did not have any Sheikhs on boards and this discouraged the public from sending money to them. In addition, two prominent Puntland Sheikhs that were widely respected and prominent in fund-raising previously (for the cyclone) were reportedly killed by Al Shabaab, and their absence is reported to have reduced the possibilities of collective fund-raising for Puntland.

This body raised no more than US\$200,000, significantly less than was raised in Somaliland, where even the Boroma Drought Committee handled five times this amount. Of this amount, an estimated US\$80,000 was spent on water-trucking, which took place in many areas, but particularly Sanaag, Bari and Nugal regions (corresponding with drought affected areas highlighted by the FSNAU).

The money received by the Puntland Drought Committee was contributed by the Puntland public and Puntland business communities. For example, Golis, a telecommunications company provided financial support, and one of the major food importers also made a financial donation to the committee. Only a small proportion of this amount

was reported to have come directly from abroad. However, as mentioned previously the funds received from the Puntland public and business community may have a diaspora component where, for example, household level remittance income is re-directed to such a committee.

A network of UK mosques, including some in London and Birmingham, were amongst the diaspora groups that sent money to these Sheikhs in Bosasso. Money raised by the mosque was given to the organisations, Al Irshad, in the UK, who then sent the money to the Committee. The Committee is reported to still have US\$50,000 in its account that it did not spend on the drought response.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The mapping exercise conducted for this study identified seventy actors across Europe, who mobilised resources in response to the impact of the drought in Somaliland and Puntland in 2016 (see Annex I). These actors came together in various different forms, with the majority of funds raised occurring through either clan-based groups or through (attendees of) mosques. The vast majority of the actors identified are informal in nature rather than registered organisations (the mosques are the main exception to this pattern) and, as such, keep no or minimal documentation and use the services of MTOs (particularly Dahabshil) to move money around. The role of diaspora actors in relation to a disaster is largely to raise and send money. There is little or no demand or expectation to follow exactly how the money is used.

By far the most significant motivation to raise money was associated with the clear evidence of suffering, in Awdal region, which received coverage on Somali media. The Awdal Drought Committee received by far the largest share of money from the Somali diaspora. This is likely to have disproportionately come from the Gadabursi clan, but they will have been able to raise and receive money from other clans too. However, the clear evidence of suffering in Awdal region appears to have acted as a catalyst for a much wider resource mobilisation effort, by different actors, in response to the drought effects across Somaliland and, to a much lesser extent, Puntland.

The effectiveness of the relief interventions, to which the diaspora groups contributed, cannot be generalised and was difficult to ascertain. Where needs are self-evident and visible, targeting is clear. However, once these people and areas have received assistance, the distribution of resources may become more based on principles of fairness and sharing, rather than needs alone, which become more difficult to distinguish.

The majority of resources were used to supply food and improve access to water, although significant amounts were used for tractor ploughing and other recovery activities. Some responding actors, such as the Awdal Drought Committee, in Boroma, and Manhal, in Sanaag region, were generally praised and trusted for their work. There were also reports of duplication, some losses of food and an over-supply of aid, which reflect more problematic issues. A significant amount of the resources arrived in April, after the arrival of the rains, suggesting that fund-raising and collection was partially late, but that there was some flexibility with resources switched to tractor ploughing and other recovery activities and, in some cases, saved.



## Recommendations

*Developing* a more in-depth understanding of the motivations, processes and dynamics around diaspora resource mobilisation in times of emergency requires *a case study approach*, using researcher/s that have or can gain access to particular clans or social groups, and who have sufficient time to undertake the work (the process may take place over several weeks). Ideally such case studies should be developed in real time (as a response process is taking place). Such case studies should include time in the diaspora location and the possibility of following the money to see exactly how it is used in Somalia/Somaliland. The main caveat with this approach is in being able to find researchers that have or can develop good access to key informants while maintaining a degree of objectiveness. Furthermore, any engagement with diaspora populations on sensitive issues should have a strong ethical underpinning.

*Matching funds* raised by the diaspora with funds provided by an organisation such as DRC, may enable greater access to information and understanding of diaspora-related humanitarian activities and potential collaborations.

Exploring in more detail the role and potential of the *Somalia media* (satellite TV and websites) in relation to humanitarian responses would be useful to develop; for example, focused research on the potential to utilise media to promote key messaging (e.g. in relation to early warning and early action or prevention activities), or to improve coordination and accountability.

*Consider convening a series of workshops* in different locations/countries, in the UK and Europe, to explore the potential for and limits to improved coordination amongst Somali diaspora groups in response to a disaster.

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## Annex 1

	Name / Who	Country (city/ town)	Background of entity	Amount raised (est.)	How funds transferred	Source of funds	Who, where sent to (and which month)	How money used?
<b>United Kingdom</b>								
1	Hoodaale Women	Bristol	<b>Informal Sa'ad Muse Women's</b> Organisation in Bristol. They have a monthly contribution of \$5.	US \$10,300	Through Dahabshil	Regular contributions of <b>Sa'ad Muse</b> women in Bristol	Sheikh, February 2016, Hargeysa Somaliland	Food, Water
2	<b>Sa'ad Muse</b> sub-clan (men)	Bristol	Clan members	US \$14,000	Through Dhahabshil - sent it to two different individuals.	Clan Members	Hoodaale, Hargeysa, (March)	Food, Water
3	Jibril Abokar sub-clan	Bristol	<b>Sub-clan of Sa'ad Muse</b>	US \$6,000	Dahabshil	Clan Members	Mayor, Gabiley, Somaliland	Food, Water
4	Reer Samatar sub-clan	Bristol	<b>Sub-clan of Sa'ad Muse</b>	US \$10,000	Dahabshil	Clan members	A sheikh In Hargeysa who runs a charity.	Food, Water
5	Alhuda Mosque	Bristol	A mosque	US \$1,000	Dahabshil	Mosque Collection	A sheikh in Awdal	Food, Water
6	An Individual	Bristol	An individual	US \$1,200	Dahabshiil	Warsangeli clan members as well other Somali community members	An individual, Erigabo, (April)	Distributed as cash \$50 for each family
7	Gadabursi clan members in Bristol	Bristol	Clan members	US \$3,000	Hawala	Clan Members	Drought Committee of Awdal	Food, water, input for farmers
8	An Individual	Bristol	Individual	-	Hawala	Collected money from Somali community and businesses	Awdal	*
9	Arab sub-clan in Bristol	Bristol	Sub-clan of Isaaq		Dahabshiil	Clan members	Hargeysa, Abdirahman Qoote and Mubarak	See 69

10	A group of youth in Bristol	Bristol	A group of youth who are known in the city to fundraise for individuals facing hardship	US \$1,700	Dahabshiiil	Fund raising from the Somali public and businesses	Awdal Drought committee	*
11	Al Irshad Islamic Association	London	Formal registered active organisation	US \$7,000	Hawala	Collections from various mosques across the country	Sheikh - relief committee of the East	*
10	Al Irshad Islamic Association	London	Formal registered active organisation	US \$4,000	Hawala	Collections from Alrisala Mosque	Individual Borama Somaliland.	*
11	Alhuda Mosque	East London	Formal registered active	US \$3,100 (£2,500 GBP)	Dahabshil	Collection		*
13	East African Dev. organisation	London	Formal, registered and active	US \$55,000	Dahabshiiil	Clan members contribution	Hoodaale, Hargeysa	Food, water and farm inputs
14	DaraSalam Mosque, Alrisalah, Brent cultural centre, Yorkway Centre	London	A group of mosques that came together to fundraise for the drought victims		Hawala	Fundraising from many avenues including tv station	Alkaram, Hargeysa.	Food and water
15	Samaroon sub-clan	London	Sub-clan of Gadabursi. Different areas of London had different committees of women and men.	US\$ 60 – 70,000		Donations from the members of the clan	Awdal Drought Comittee	*
16	Jibril Abokar sub-clan	London	Sub-clan of Sa'ad Muse			Donation from the community		*
17	<b>Sa'ad Muse</b>	Sheffield	Clan members	US \$3,000	Dhabshiiil	Member contribution	Hoodaale, Hargeysa	Food and water
18	Gadabursi clan in UK	UK	Members of the clan	US\$ 125,000 (£100,000 GBP)	Hawala	Clan members contribution	Drought committee of Awdal	*
19	Gaaroodi sub-clan	UK	Sub-clan of Eda Gale (Isaaaq)		Dahabshil	Clan members contribution	Gaaroodi, Hargeysa, March	*
20	Hudduun	UK	Isse clan diaspora organisation	US \$30,000	Hawala	Clan members contributions	Sent to the clan leader in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia.	Restock
21	Africa Relief Fund	UK	Fundraising	US 35,000		Donations from the diaspora	Somaliland and Puntland	*

22	Horn Cable TV	UK	TV Station (Satellite TV)			Donations from viewers		*
23	Al Nasar1	UK	A group of Women who support projects in East Sanaag. They are based in UK and have a sister organisation in Badhan, Sanaag.	\$1,200	Hawala	Donations	Alnasar, Badhan, Sanaag. Alnasar women also fundraised in Badhan	Water
24	Warsangali Community	UK	Members of the Warsangali community in UK	US \$5,000	Hawala	Donations from the members	SADSO (Salam Dev. Society) in Badhan / March	Water trucking
25	London, Wembley Somali Community	UK	Members and businesses of Somali Community	US \$80,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
26	Cardiff Somali Community	UK	Members and businesses of Somali Community	US \$40,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
27	Manchester Somali Community	UK	Members and businesses of Somali community	US \$47000 (24000 + 23000)	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
28	Sa'ad Muse sub-clan in Birmingham	Birmingham	Members of the sub clan	US \$6,872	Dahabshiil	Clan <b>members'</b> contributions	Hoodaale, Hargeysa, March	*
29	Cardiff	Cardiff	Members of the Isaaq Clan	US \$13,000	Dahabshiil		Hoodaale, Hargeysa	*
<b>Denmark</b>								
30	Al-tawheed	CPH, DK	Mosque	US \$32,000	Dahabshiil/ Amal	Donations from the community	Alkaram Hargeysa \$20,000 and Alkaram in Sool and Sanaag \$12000	Awdal, Sool and Sanaag.
31	Arhus, Denmark, Altaqwa Mosque	Arhus	Mosque			Donations from the community		*
32	Odense Somali commune including the three Somali	DK	The Somali community including the three Somali Mosques in Odense came	Approx. US \$10,000	Dahabshil	Donations from the Somali community	The Drought Committee of Somaliland	*

	mosques		together and formed a committee					
33	Puntland Diaspora Org.	DK						
34	Somali community	Odense, DK	The whole Somali Community	US \$ 8,535 60,000 Kroner Danish	Dahabshiil	Donations	Drought committee Somaliland	*
35	Waqf	Alborg, DK	Mosque	-		Donations		*
36	<b>Sa'ad Muse</b> sub-clan, in Denmark	DK	Clan members	US \$10,450 (2450, 5000, 3000)	Dahabshiil	Donations from the <b>Sa'ad Muse</b> Community	Hoodaale	*
37	Somali community in Denmark	DK	Mainly Samaroon/Gadabursi community	US \$ 42,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
38	DASMO (Danish Somali Makhir Org.)	DK	Members of the Warsangali clan	US \$2,000	Hawala	Donation from members	SADSO (Salam Dev. Society ) in Badhan / early March	Water trucking
<b>Sweden</b>								
39	Alnoor Mosque	Stockholm	Mosque			Donations		*
40	Alsunah Mosque	Goteborg	Mosque					*
41	<b>Sa'ad Muse</b> community in Sweden	Sweden	Clan members	US\$15,992	Dahabshiil	Donations from the <b>Sa'ad Muse</b> Community	\$13,992 to Hoodaale and \$2000 to Gabiley	*
42	Somali Community in Sweden	Sweden	Members of the Somali community in Sweden, (not Warsangeli only)	US \$5,000	Hawala	Donations from members	SADSO (Salam Dev. Society ) in Badhan / March	Water trucking
43	Samaroon sub-clan	Sweden	Members of the Samaroon / Gadabursi community	US \$6,800	Hawala	Donations from members	Awdal Drought Committee/ April	*
44	Samaroon sub-clan	Malmo, Sweden	Members of the Samaroon / Gadabursi community	US \$16,000	Hawala	Donations from members	Awdal Drought Committee/ April	*
45	Samaroon sub-clan	Borlange , Sweden	Members of the Samaroon Community	US \$3,800	Hawala	Donations from members	Awdal Drought Committee / April	*

46	Samaroon sub-clan	Small towns in Sweden	Members of the Samaroon Community	US \$4,800	Hawala	Donations from members	Awdal Drought Committee / April	*
47	Samaroon sub-clan	Goteborg, Sweden	Members of the Samaroon Community	US \$3,600	Hawala	Donations from members	Awdal Drought Committee	*
48	Warsangeli clan in Stockholm	Stockholm	Members of the Warsangeli community in Stockholm	US \$3,000	Hawala	Donations from the members	SADSO (Salam Dev. Society ) in Badhan / March	Water trucking
49	Somali Community in Sweden	Sweden	Members of Somali Community, mainly Samaroon members	US \$60,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
<b>Finland</b>								
50	Alhuda Mosque (Helisinki Islamic Centre)	Helsinki	Mosque	US \$3,650	Hawala	Donations from the Somali community	Alkaram Dev,organisation	Dist. as food to more than 2000 beneficiaries in Bacado Awdal region
51	Turke Somali Community	Turke, Finland	Somali Community responding on their own		Hawala	Donations from the Somali community in Turke		*
52	A number of Somali centres coming together	Across Finland	Somali Centres	US \$2,000 +	Hawala	Donations from the Somali community in Finland	Alkaram Dev. Organisation	Food dist.
53	<b>Sa'ad Muse</b> Community in Finland	Finland		US \$3,200	Dahabshill	Donations from the <b>Sa'ad Musa</b> Community	Gabiley	*
54	Finland Samaroon Community members	Finland	Samaroon members	US \$16,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
<b>Norway</b>								
55	Tawfiq	Oslo	Mosque	Not known but substantial	Alrahma	Donations	Alrahmah, Boorama Awdal	*

56		Stavanger, Norway	Mosque					*
57	Dar Al Iman Islamic Centre	Trondheim, Norway	Mosque					*
58	Al Rahmah Relief	Norway	Donations from the Somali community in Norway (Tawfiq mosque lead this)	US \$30,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
59	Awdal Women in Norway	Norway	Donations from the Samaroon women in Norway	US \$24,000	Hawala	Donations	Awdal Drought Committee	*
<b>Netherlands</b>								
60	Quba	Amsterdam	Mosque	None				*
61	Sa'ad Muse sub-clan, using the organisation called SAMO	NL	SAMO	US \$1,000	Hawala	Donations from the Sa'ad Muse Community	Hoodaale	*
62	Isse Comm. in Netherlands	NL	Isaa Community	US \$ 15,880; 15,000 Euros	Hawala	Donations from the Isse clan	Elders in Djibouti/ May	Restocking
<b>Other European</b>								
63	Isse clan in all Scan. Countries	Scandinavia	The Isse community in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway	US \$20,000	Hawala	Donations from the Isse Clan members	Elders in Djibouti/ May	Re-stocking
64	Issa Comm. in Germany	GE	Members of the Isse clan in Germany	More than 10,000 Euros (US\$ 10,587)	Hawala	Donations from members	Elders in Djibouti/ May	Re-stocking
65	Individuals	Italy		Not significant	Hawala		Awdal Drought Committee	*
<b>Other non-European</b>								
66	Alkaram	Somali-land						
67	Warsangali comm. in	Canada	Members of the Warsangali clan	\$1,800	Hawala	Members of the clan	Adesso, Badhan	*



	Canada							
68	Amoud Foundation	US/Somalia			Hawala	Fundraised from North America and brought large amounts of money	Amoud Foundation, Boorama	*
69	Arab Isaaq Community	Global	Arab isaaq sub clan community around the world using Gormad <b>organisation's</b> Whatsapp as media and contact.	US \$70,000	Dahabshill account in Hargeysa for Gormad Relief	All donation from the Arab community around the world	Gormad Relief in Hargeysa. This money was all spent in Balli Gubadley as food and water.	Food and water
70	Individuals from around the globe	Global		Significant amount in total	Hawala		Awdal Drought Committee	*
71	29 Muslim organisations	World, mostly from the Middle East		Significant resources			Coordinated by Awdal Drought Committee	*

\* Where the specific use of the money is not recorded, this is because the sender does not know exactly as his/her money is deposited in a central account and used for different purposes, in which he/she is not involved. That said, the majority of the money will have been used for food and water.

## Annex II

KII: Key informant interview

FGD: Focus group discussion

	Type	Interviewee	Location
1	KII	Sheikh - Somaliland National Drought Committee	Ali Matan Mosque, Hargeysa
2	KII	Sheikh - Gurmud Relief	Hargeysa
3	KII	Individual	Hargeysa
4	KII	A member of Sheikh team and the National Drought committee	Hargeysa
5	KII	Member of Hoodaale organisation	Hargeysa
6	Kii	Idagale elder	Hargeysa
7	Kii	Individual	Hargeysa
8	KII	Individual	Hargeysa
9	KII	Rift Valley Institute	Hargeysa
10	KII	Individual	Bristol
11	KII	Individual	Bristol
12	KII	Individual, Idagala member	Bristol
13	KII	Individual	Bristol
14	KII	Individual, Idagale clan member	Bristol
15	KII	Elder, member of Hoodaale	Bristol
16	KII	Elder, member of Hoodaale	Bristol
19	KII	A woman, member of Hoodaale women	Bristol
20	KII	Member of Arab community in Bristol	Bristol
21	KII	Member of Alhuda Mosque	Bristol
22	KII	Member of Albaseera mosque	Bristol
23	KII	<b>Sermon deliverer, about collections in the North and Habar Je'lo Community in UK</b>	Bristol
24	KII	A member of youth group who collect money for Somali causes	Bristol
25	KII	A Somali shopkeeper, about any collections	Bristol
26	KII	A Hawala owner, about collections and remittances	Bristol
27	KII	<b>A habar Yonis elder about the sub clan's collections</b>	Bristol
28	KII	A warsangali member who collected money for Sanag region	Bristol
29	KII	<b>A warsangali elder about the clan's collection</b>	Bristol
30	KII	Member of Alrahma Mosque, Birmingham	Birmingham
31	KII	Member of Alrahma Mosque, Birmingham	Birmingham
32	KII	Member of Alnoor Mosque, Birmingham	Birmingham
33	KII	Elder of the Isaq community in Birmingham	Birmingham
34	KII	Elder of the Isaq Community in Birmingham	Birmingham
35	KII	Member of Alhuda Mosque in Birmingham	Birmingham
36	KII	Individual of the Gudabirse diaspora	Bristol
37	KII	Member of the Gudabirse community	Bristol
38	KII	Member of the Godabirse Community in Bristol	Bristol
39	KII	Elder of the Issa Community in Bristol	Bristol
40	KII	Member of the Isaq community in Cardiff	Cardiff
41	KII	Member of the Isaq Community in Cardiff	Cardiff
42	KII	Member of the Warsangali community in Liverpool	Liverpool, phone
43	KII	Member of the Isaq Community in Manchester	Manchester, Phone
44	KII	Member of the Isaq community in Sheffield	Sheffield, phone
45	KII	Member of the Isaq community in Sheffield	Sheffield. phone
46	KII	Member of Jibril Abokor Family	Bristol
47	KII	Member fo the Jibril Abokor Family	Bristol
48	KII	Head of EID (East Africa Development Organisation)	London, phone

49	KII	Head of Alirshad	London, Phone
50	KII	Member of Alirshad, London	London, phone
51	KII	Sheikh of the Quba mosque	London, phone
52	KII	Member of Quba Mosque committee	London, phone
53	KII	Member of the Dar Assalam Mosque London	London, phone
54	KII	Member of Alhuda Mosque, East London	London, phone
56	KII	Head of Brent cultural Centre London	London, phone
57	KII	Individual, about tv fundraising	London, phone
58	KII	TV religious programmes presenter about fund raising	London, phone
59	KII	Africa Relief Fund, leader	London, phone
60	KII	Africa Relief Fund, employee	London, phone
61	KII	Leader of York Way Centre, London	London, phone
62	KII	Individual from Puntland Diaspora in Odense, Denmark	Odense, phone
63	KII	Member of Arhus Mosque, Denmark	Arhus, phone
64	KII	Member of Arhus Puntland Community	Arhus, phone
65	KII	Member of Copenhagen Isaq Community	Copenhagen, phone
66	KII	Member of Dulbahanta Community in Arhus	Arhus, phone
67	KII	Individual from Hudduun, the Issa Diaspora community	Copenhagen, phone
68	KII	Representative of the Odense Somali Community, Denmark	Odense, phone
69	KII	Sheikh Of Odense, Denmark Somali Community about the funds raised	Cairo, Egypt, Phone
70	KII	<b>Former Oslo's Committee member about collections</b>	Oslo, phone
71	KII	Imam, Oslo	Oslo, phone
72	KII	Individual from the Isaq community in Oslo	Oslo, phone
73	KII	Member of the Warsageli community, Oslo	Oslo, phone
74	KII	Member of the Puntland Diaspora, Oslo	Oslo, phone
75	KII	Member of Waqf Mosque, Alborg, Denmark	Alborg, phone
76	KII	Member of Somali Community in Alborg	Alborg, phone
77	KII	Member of Altaqwa Mosque, Arhus, Denmark	Arhus, phone
78	KII	Member of Alnoor Mosque, Stockholm	Stockholm, phone
79	KII	Member of Somali Community, Stockholm	Stockholm, phone
80	KII	Member of Alhudda Mosque committee, Helsinki, Finland	Helsinki, Phone
81	KII	Member of Alhuda Mosque Helsinki	Helsinki, phone
82	KII	Member of Alsunnah Mosque, Gutenberg	Gutenberg, phone
83	KII	Two members of Quba Mosque, Amsterdam	Amsterdam, phone
84	KII	Well known fundraiser from Iskushuban	London, phone
85	KII	Dashishe elder in Bristol	Bristol
86	KII	Leader of Dar Aliman Islamci Centre, Troinham, Norway	Troinheim, phone
87	KII	Turke Somali Community, Turke, Finland	Turke, phone
88	KII	Member of Somali Community in Helsinki	Helsinki, phone
89	KII	Member of SAMO organisation, Amsterdam, Netherlands	Amsterdam, phone
90	KII	Member of Puntland Diaspora Organisations	Nairobi, Kenya
91	KII	Member of Isq Diaspora	Nairobi, Kenya
92	KII	Expert about Puntland Response	Nairobi Kenya
93	KII	Expert about Puntland response	Nairobi Kenya
94	KII	Gubadley Admin team (2) Gubadley Somaliland	Gubadley
95	FGD	Gubadley, Mix of elders from village and nomads	Gubadley
96	KII	A nomadic elder in Gubadley	Gubadley
97	KII	A nomadic family outside Gubadley village	Gubadley
98	KII	Two women buying vegetables from farmers outside Arabsiya village	Arabsiya
99	KII	Two women tending to their herd of Shoats outside farms near Gabiley	Gabiley
100	KII	A shop owner in Gabiley Town	Gabiley town
101	KII	The Mayor of Gabiley Town	Gabiley Town
102	KII	Member of Gabiley Drought Committee and Mutaqbal Hawala owner in Gabiley	Gabiley Town
103	KII	Youth organisation in Gabiley town	Gbiley Town

104	KII	Village head of Kalabayrka village	Kalabayrka village
105	KII	Individual from the mosque	Kalabayrka village
106	KII	The village head of Kalabayrka village	Kalabayrka village
107	FGD	Group of elders representing different communities in and around kalabayka village	Kalabayrka Village
108	KII	Alkaram Representative in Awdal	Borama
109	KII	Amoud Foundation representative	Borama
110	KII	Member of Awdal Drought committee	Borama
111	KII	Qunujeed Village Head	Qunujeed village
112	FGD	Qunujeed communities representatives	Qunujeed
113	KII	Member of Awdal Drought Commiittee	Qunujeed
114	KII	Walaal Goo Village Head	Walaal Goo village
115	FGD	Representatives of communities of village	Walaal Goo village
116	KII	Agamso Vaillage residents 2	Agamso village
117	KII	Individual in Bosaso about Bari region	Bosaso
118	KII	Individual from Puntland Scholars who responded to the drought	Qardho, Phone
119	KII	Iskushuban resident	Bosaso
120	KII	Fatima Jibril, founder of Adesso and resident of Eastern Sanaag	Badhan
121	KII	A political representative for Sanaag region	Badhan
122	KII	A political representative of Badhan District	Badhan
123	KII	A political representative of Badhan District	Badhan
124	KII	Representative of Salam Organisation	In the mountains, phone
125	KII	Representative of Manhaj in Badhan	Badhan
126	FGD	Badhan neighbourhoods representatives and elders	Badhan
127	FGD	Badhan neighbourhoods representatives (Women)	Badhan
128	KII	Badhan resident (Woman)	Badhan
130	KII	A businessman in Badhan	Badhan
131	FGD	Armale village representatives (men)	Armala, Erigavo
132	FGD	Armale village representatives (Women)	Armala, Erigavo
133	KII	Armale village Head	Armala, Erigavo